Young People with Immigrant Backgrounds: What Are the Barriers to Their Economic Integration?

Pierre-Yves Cusset*, Hélène Garner**, Mohamed Harfi**, Frédéric Lainé** and David Marguerit*

As France examines the fractures that divide its social model and as the government prepares measures designed to promote the civic and economic participation of residents from disadvantaged neighbourhoods, it is essential to act based on an analysis that distinguishes the multiple reasons that impede the economic integration of "young people with immigrant backgrounds."

These difficulties can be identified in education, employment, housing and living conditions; they are particularly marked for certain population groups, including boys, children with two immigrant parents and descendants of African immigrants. These difficulties primarily reflect the socio-economic situation of these young people and that of their parents, exposed to the shortcomings of our public policy: labour market entry barriers for the young and less-skilled, strong influence of the socio-economic background of students on their academic achievement, lack of fluidity in the housing market and discrimination in society. The observations are similar for residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

Whether in education, employment or housing, analysis shows that a significant part of these people’s disparities, in comparison with those not directly descended from immigrants, cannot be explained solely by socio-demographic factors. Such a finding argues for supplementing ordinary-law policies with specific policies designed to fight inequality. That is why France Stratégie will soon provide proposals to make our public policy more favourable for these populations, who are subject to multiple difficulties.

**Level of Diploma upon Leaving the Education System, by Origin of Parents (2007-2012)**

![Graph showing levels of diploma upon leaving the education system by origin of parents](source)

- Higher education diploma
- Secondary diploma
- CAP-BEP vocational certificate
- No diploma

- Descendants of European immigrants
- Descendants of immigrants from other continents

**Unemployment Rate for Young Workers, by Country of Origin of Parents (2012)**

![Graph showing unemployment rate for young workers](source)

- Men under 30
- Women under 30
- Total under 30
- Total under 25

- Not descended from immigrants
- Descendants of African immigrants

No diploma: no diploma or only a certificate from lower secondary school (collège); Africa: including the Maghreb (North Africa).

Note: 33% of the descendants of African immigrants obtained higher education diplomas between 2007 and 2012, against 45% of those not directly descended from immigrants.


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INTRODUCTION

“Young people with immigrant backgrounds” could include both young immigrants and descendants of immigrants living in France. However, it is commonly used to refer to “second generation” children born to parents who migrated to France during various waves of migration.1 While the parents went through a migratory experience after leaving their country of origin, their children were born and educated in France, and almost all of them have French nationality. These children have, on average, a worse employment situation than young “natives”, i.e. French youths not directly descended from immigrants. This special edition of La Note d’analyse addresses the economic integration difficulties experienced by these young descendants of immigrants, and seeks to identify the principal contributing factors.

Behind the difficulties in professional integration observed for young descendants of immigrants, we find situations that differ drastically, in particular according to the origin of immigrant parents. Descendants of immigrants from Africa are both the most affected by unemployment and the least well-integrated in employment, while descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe experience situations similar to those of natives. For workers under 25 years of age, the unemployment rate for descendants of African immigrants (including the Maghreb, North Africa) reached 42% in 2012 against 22% for descendants of European immigrants and natives. Female descendants of African immigrants, while slightly less affected by unemployment than men, still have lower participation rates than women not directly descended from immigrants. With the economic crisis, these young people from African immigration backgrounds have seen a substantial deterioration in their employment integration.

These observations also apply to the quality of integration into the labour market. On average, the descendants of African immigrants have greater job insecurity (fixed term contracts, temporary work) and are more likely to experience periods of unemployment after finishing school, while descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe experience access to paths to employment that compare with those of young people not directly descended from immigrants. Descendants of African immigrants also obtain fewer jobs in the state civil service. Young descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb have the largest gap between their level of diploma and the qualification for the position they hold.

Multiple factors, partially interdependent, can be proposed to explain the particular difficulties of access to employment faced by young descendants of immigrants. One type of factor, with a partial repercussion on the others, is based on social characteristics, and particularly the socio-economic background that constitutes these young people’s environment. Descendants of immigrants come from more modest social backgrounds than the general population: three quarters of the descendants of two immigrant parents have a father who is a manual worker, against just under half for descendants of couples with only one immigrant parent and just over a third for children of non-immigrant parents. Also, when descendants of immigrants finish their studies, they are more likely to have an unemployed parent. More than 20% of them live below the poverty line, against 10% of French people not directly descended from immigrants, and this trend is particularly strong when they are still living with their parents.

The educational career and orientation process for descendants of immigrants also serve to explain these difficulties. They finish school without receiving a diploma more frequently than natives do, their average educational levels are lower and, for descendants of immigrants from Africa and Turkey, get degrees in sectors often providing less professional integration (e.g. apprenticeship training). Their modest origins partly explain these differences in their educational careers. However, the social environment does not explain everything. Statistical analysis of student performance on PISA tests (Program for International Student Assessment) shows that, even after controlling for socio-economic background, French students with immigrant backgrounds have, on average, lower scores than those of native students, equivalent to a year of education.

“Young people with immigrant backgrounds” are often also perceived as residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, highlighting a third phenomenon, that of spatial segregation and concentration of immigrants’ descendants, as well as of immigrants, in neighbourhoods subject to multiple social and economic difficulties: economically disadvantaged municipalities, high unemployment, longer distance from areas with jobs, inadequate transport network, lower density of certain public services, etc. This situation hinders school careers and inhibits access to employment for everyone living in these areas; descendants of immigrants do not appear to be specifically penalised in this regard.

1. This Note d’analyse is based on data published by Insee, Dares, DEPP, Cereq, Ined, DSED, DGAFP, ONZUS and OECD. See box 1 for definitions.
However, even after controlling for structural effects (parents’ social origin, educational level, location), the higher unemployment risk persists for descendants of immigrants. This unexplained gap, very large for descendants of African immigrants, is a result of factors not considered in the surveys used to establish this fact. Among these unexplained factors are phenomena of employment discrimination related primarily to the young people’s supposed origin or their place of residence. This discrimination, measured in particular via “testing” techniques, is particularly pronounced for young descendants of African immigrants and for young men. Moreover, they feel this discrimination quite strongly: a quarter of immigrants and descendants of immigrants reported having experienced discrimination in the past five years; for those from sub-Saharan Africa, this rises to nearly half of those surveyed. The principal criterion of discrimination they experienced was their skin colour. Living in a priority neighbourhood also increases the feeling of having suffered job-related discrimination.

This special edition of La Note d’analyse addresses the difficulties of economic integration in terms of education, employment, housing and standard of living.

**SCHOOL CAREERS THAT DO NOT FAVOUR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION**

In spite of the democratisation of access to education, significant inequalities in learning remain. These inequalities begin in pre-school and compromise access to selective higher education institutions when students pursue higher education. They show up when students leave the education system with a level of studies and a diploma that are not conducive to good economic integration. The OECD’s international comparisons also show the characteristics of education systems that help explain some of the differences in performance for students with immigrant backgrounds.

**Difficulties that Accumulate Throughout Schooling**

The differences in performance and academic trajectories for young people with immigrant backgrounds depend on several interrelated factors, including past academic performance, orientation, social origin, their school’s characteristics and their place of residence. These differences are therefore the product of inequalities accumulated throughout the learning process, beginning in pre-school.

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2. There is now copious information available based on geographic origin, although it remains difficult to exhaustively classify situations based on very detailed geographic origin.
5. “Trajectoires et origines”, Ined. Note: children born in France of repatriated parents are not considered descendants of immigrants if their parents were of French nationality.
From Schooling Difficulties to Dropping Out

Due to an environment that is often less favourable for learning the language, a long process of quiet disengagement occurs for many children with immigrant backgrounds, starting from a very early age.

This delay in learning and in the acquisition of language skills begins before elementary school, particularly because these young people are less likely to have attended at least three years of pre-school (82% against 96% for other children). This creates significant differences in national test scores for year-seven students. Students with immigrant backgrounds score 10 points lower in French (46/100 on average against 56 for other students) and 8 points lower in mathematics (57/100 on average against 65). The lag accumulated by these young people before they enter year-seven also impedes their progress in lower secondary school, where only 56% of them have not repeated a year and have received their secondary school diploma, against 70% for other students.

Difficulties not fully explained by the Social Environment

The results of PISA tests show that 15 year olds with immigrant backgrounds are at least twice as likely to be among students with difficulties. In the 2012 survey, their proportion among students who score below level 2 in mathematics (on a scale of 6) reached 43% in France, against 22% for all students and 23% on average in OECD countries. This observation confirms the results of national assessments. How can we explain such differences? Some answers are provided via analysis of correlations between performance on PISA tests and characteristics of students and schools.

Young people with immigrant backgrounds often come from disadvantaged situations. It is estimated that in France, three quarters of these young people belong to a family whose head is a labourer, service employee or unemployed, against only a third for young people who do not have immigrant parents. Moreover, the socio-economic environment’s impact on school performance is much higher in France than in most other OECD countries. In France, mathematics scores are 57 points higher for those belonging to more advantaged social categories, the largest gap in any OECD country (in 2012). In terms of duration of schooling, this is equivalent to almost two years of study.

Nevertheless, statistical analysis shows that, even after considering socio-economic background, students with immigrant backgrounds in France score 37 points lower than other students, nearly the equivalent of one year of study (against 21 points on average in OECD countries).

Combined Difficulties Exacerbate Educational Inequalities

The organisation of the French education system also impedes these pupils’ progress: the distribution of students with immigrant backgrounds within French schools shows one of the highest concentrations in OECD countries (Figure 1). If the distribution of these students was similar to that of their peers, each quarter of the schools would host 25% of students with immigrant backgrounds.

In reality, 70% of students with immigrant backgrounds are enrolled in the quarter of the establishments that host the highest concentration of this population. They represent over 40% of the total population in these schools, 10 points higher than the OECD average. In addition, 53% of young people with immigrant backgrounds attend one of the schools having the highest concentrations of students whose mother is poorly educated (i.e. does not have a secondary school diploma).

The high concentration of students with immigrant backgrounds in these schools impairs their performance, as shown by correlation tests based on 2009 PISA reading literacy results (Figure 2). The correlations are particularly significant between the performance of these students and the disadvantages of the schools (here, the percentage of students with a disadvantaged social background is measured by the concentration of students with low-educated mothers, regardless of whether the latter are immigrants).

Students Rarely Choose an Orientation

Among students with immigrant backgrounds entering year-seven in 2007, only 47% had not repeated a year in lower secondary school and were oriented towards a “seconde générale ou technologique” (general or technical training at the secondary education levels), 11 points lower than students with non-immigrant backgrounds. This orientation does not always reflect their choices: they are more often interested in a programme of vocational...
training leading to a specific occupation, while their parents are more likely to want an orientation towards general training at the secondary education levels (49%) than those of students with non-immigrant backgrounds (43%). Additionally, the vocational programmes account for 50% of the annual proportion of students with schooling difficulties \(^{15}\) and have low retention rates for higher education. Moreover, even within the vocational programmes, students with immigrant backgrounds have more trouble getting an apprenticeship (15% against 29% for their peers)\(^ {16}\),\(^ {17}\) Obtaining that apprenticeship (signing a contract and being hired) constitutes the crucial step in getting a first job.\(^ {17}\) This difference cannot be explained solely by academic performance, and most likely reflects a form of discrimination.

For those oriented towards the general or technical training at the secondary education levels, differences in achievement are just as significant. Among young people not directly descended from immigrants, 64.2% obtain their secondary school diploma (baccalauréat, or "bac")\(^ {18}\), against only 32.9% among young people from Turkish immigrant backgrounds and just over half of those with immigration backgrounds from the Maghreb (50.8%), Portugal (51.3%) and Africa (55%).\(^ {18}\)

The fact that these young people with immigrant backgrounds are less often oriented towards general training at the secondary education level than their peers\(^ {19}\) does not promote their pursuit of higher education. Less likely to get a secondary school diploma specialising in sciences (bac S) (4.7% to 9.4% depending on the country of origin, against 17.4% for natives),\(^ {20}\) the presence of young people with immigrant backgrounds in selective courses and institutions remains low.\(^ {21}\)

**Too Few with Diplomas, Too Many with a Limited Level of Education**

In France, the breakdown of students by level of diploma, one year after the end of their initial studies, provides a good illustration of the result of these accumulated inequalities (Figure 3). Out of nearly 700,000 students who left the education system annually over 2007-2012, a little over 90,000, or 13%, are descendants of immigrants. If young immigrants are also included, the figure reaches 19%.

Many young descendants of immigrants leave the education system without a diploma, numbering 23,000 per year, or 24% (against 16% for other young people). However, significant disparities exist, depending on where their parents were born. For the descendants of European immigrants, the proportion is similar to that of other young people. It is twice as high for the descendants of African immigrants (30%) and 1.5 times higher for those from other regions (26%). In addition, the proportion of descendants of African immigrants who leave without a diploma is much higher among young men (39%) than it is among women (21%).

Added to this are 15,000 young descendants of immigrants who leave the education system each year with only a CAP or BEP (vocational certificates), amounting to 16%. 20% of descendants of European immigrants and 13% of those from Africa, illustrates a significant gap, which can be explained in particular by the former having a higher tendency to choose technical careers such as construction, which have more frequent access to apprenticeship programmes. Each year, a total of 40% of the young descendants of immigrants leave the education system without a diploma or with only a vocational certificate, on average numbering more than 37,000.

The proportion of young descendants of immigrants who leave the education system with only a secondary school diploma (26%) is close to that of their peers, but this masks two characteristics with cumulative effects. First, out of those who pursue their education until receiving a secondary school diploma, estimates show that young people with immigrant backgrounds receive their diploma less often (between 32% and 55% depending on the area of origin, see above) than their peers (64.2%).

Second, 38% of young people with immigrant backgrounds who continue in higher education do not finally receive their diploma, against 22% for their peers. Thus, 34% of young descendants of immigrants who leave the education system have higher education diplomas, 8 percentage points lower than their peers (42%). Young descendants of European immigrants have a better success rate (37%).

DIFFICULT INTEGRATION INTO THE LABOUR MARKET, ESPECIALLY FOR YOUNG PEOPLE OF AFRICAN ORIGIN

In 2012, descendants of immigrants represented 9.8% of the French working-age population (15-64), or 3.9 million people. In Europe, France has the largest proportion of direct descendants of European immigrants, known as “second generation”, while the proportion of immigrants in France is near the European average. This population of descendants of immigrants is particularly young: 19% of immigrants’ descendants are between 18 and 24 years of age, against 11% for the entire population. Descendants of African immigrants have the highest proportion of young people (45%), against only 10% for descendants of European immigrants. 

The difficulties in entering the labour market faced by young people in general are accentuated for certain sub-categories, correlating with their level of diploma or specialty, but also with their place of residence or whether they are descendants of immigrants. Young descendants of African immigrants therefore experience the highest unemployment rates; this is as much the result of structural factors as of unexplained residual effects, reflecting network effects or discrimination.

Higher Unemployment for Young Descendants of Non-European Immigrants

Descendants of immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than natives not directly descended from immigrants (14.2% unemployment rate against 8.6% in 2012), but less likely than the immigrants themselves (16.9%).

Table 1. Unemployment Rates by Immigrant Origins* in 2012 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment Rate for those Under 30</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate for those Under 25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Directly Descended from Immigrants</td>
<td>16 16 16 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of European Immigrants</td>
<td>17 16 16 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of African Immigrants</td>
<td>34 30 32 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of Immigrants from other Continents</td>
<td>31 17 25 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Immigrants</td>
<td>23 17 20 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Immigrants</td>
<td>34 35 35 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from other Continents</td>
<td>19 23 21 26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scope: population of households in metropolitan France.
This is especially true for those of African origin under 25 years of age, whose unemployment rate is over 40%, almost twice as high as for those not directly descended from immigrants (see Table 1). However, young descendants of European immigrants have a situation similar to that of young people not directly descended from immigrants. Among all descendants of immigrants under 30 years of age, young men are more affected by unemployment than young women are, but the latter have lower participation rates (see below).

In 2010-2012, about 120,000 young descendants of African immigrants were unemployed; nearly half of them have no diploma (Table 2).

**Table 2. Number of Unemployed People Under 30 Among the Descendants of Immigrants in 2010-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Unemployed</th>
<th>Number of Unemployed People with no Diploma*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of European Immigrants</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of African Immigrants</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of Immigrants from Other Continents</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The risk of unemployment for young descendants of African immigrants rose sharply with the outbreak of the crisis, between 2008 and 2010 (Figure 4).

**Figure 4. Unemployment Rate for Those Aged 15-29 by Immigrant Background (2007-2012)**

Men under 30 who are descendants of African immigrants are also less active than their peers not directly descended from immigrants, with respective inactivity rates of 16% and 8% among those who have completed their initial training. For young women who are descendants of African immigrants, the inactivity rate in 2012 reached 28%, against 15% for natives.

**A Higher Risk of Unemployment, all Things Being Equal**

Among all people under 30, the risk of unemployment is higher for those with no diploma (multiplied by 2.2 against those with a general secondary diploma), for holders of a CAP-BEP certificate for a specialty in the services sector and for young people whose father is an unskilled manual worker, service sector employee or inactive, or whose mother is inactive (Table 3).

Unemployment risk is also related to place of residence. It is lower in metropolitan Paris and highest in medium-sized and large metropolitan areas in northern or southern France. Living in a ZUS (zone urbaine sensible; sensitive urban zone) increases the probability of being unemployed by half. The risk of unemployment is therefore related not only to individuals’ characteristics, but also to the characteristics of local labour markets, including “spatial matching” between one’s place of residence and the location of jobs, and thus the means that favour (or impair) this matching (transport

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31. This extremely high unemployment is observed for all levels of diploma and all age categories, cf. 2013 ONZUS report.
networks, presence of companies in the ZUS, more general environmental and employment accessibility issues).

Descendants of African immigrants are subject to negative structural effects: a lower average level of education, a larger proportion of their population under 30 years of age, low socio-economic social background (see below) and a more pronounced localisation in the ZUS. A quarter of the descendants of African immigrants and 23% of those from Turkey live in ZUS, against only 6% of the descendants of European immigrants and 4% for natives. An element facilitating their integration is their higher concentration in Île-de-France (the Paris region), which has a particularly dynamic economy and nearly a quarter of France’s salaried jobs: 40% of the descendants of African immigrants live there – but the quality of its transport networks varies amongst localities.

The higher risk of unemployment for descendants of African immigrants persists, all things being equal, i.e., even when controlling for effects of age, diploma, social origin or place of residence (Table 3): compared to a native, this risk is almost doubled and it appears stronger than the risk of unemployment linked to residence in a ZUS (multiplied by 1.5).

The Burden of Residual Effects on High Unemployment of Young People Descended from African Immigrants

For those under 30, about half the unemployment variations to the detriment of descendants of African immigrants are not explained by structural variables such as age, gender, diploma level and specialisation, socio-professional category of the father and mother and place of residence (ZUS or not) (see above Figure 4). Unexplained residual effects (e.g. discrimination, effect of on-the-job training, language proficiency, effects of social networks) are also quite marked for African immigrants.

Lower Quality of Integration into Stable Employment

The quality of integration into employment for descendants of immigrants is not the same as for the general population either: they are overexposed to job insecurity and instability. After completing initial training, young descendants of African immigrants were more likely than others to obtain interim positions or short-term or fixed-term work contracts.

### Tableau 3. Unemployment Risk Factors for People Under 30 Years of Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Odds Ratio (Risk Factor)</th>
<th>for Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20 Years</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24 Years</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29 Years</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years 2009 to 2012</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years 2007 to 2008</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Diploma</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP-BEP Certificate in Services Sector</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP-BEP Certificate in Production Sector</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General bac</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bac in Services Sector</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bac in Production Sector</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bac+2 Year Degree in Health or Social Sectors</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education Diploma in Services Sector or Humanities</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education Diploma in Production or Science</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Inactive</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father in Non-Salaried Position</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father in Managerial Position</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father in Intermediate Profession</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Is Service or Sale Worker</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Is Worker in other Category</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Is Skilled Manual Worker</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Is Unskilled Manual Worker</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Inactive</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother in other Situation</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Metropolitan Paris</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Medium-Sized or Large Metropolitan Area in Northern France</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Medium-Sized or Large Metropolitan Area in Southern France</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives Elsewhere in France</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in a ZUS</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not Live in a ZUS</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant from Europe</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant from Africa</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Immigrant Origins</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendant of European Immigrants</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendant of African Immigrants</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendant of Immigrants from other Continents</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Directly Descended from Immigrants</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimate based on a logit model considering age, gender, effects of the business cycle (years 2009-2012), the diploma’s level and specialisation, social origin of father and mother, the place of residence and geographic origin. The odds ratios by geographic origin highlight the effects, excluding structural effects. For example, the odds ratio between gross unemployment rate for descendants of African immigrants and natives is 2.6 for the years 2007-2012. Excluding structural effects, that odds ratio is 1.9.

Interpretation: the risk of unemployment for people under 20 is multiplied by 1.9 compared to those aged 25 to 29, “all things being equal”.


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32. Insee References (2012), op. cit.
They more frequently experience periods of unemployment: 29% of them have experienced at least two years of unemployment during their first five years of professional life, against only 8% for young descendants of Southern European immigrants and 11% for natives. And five years after the end of their studies, the probability that they will have a stable job is a third lower than for natives or descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe.

**Figure 5. Difference in Average Unemployment Rate for People Under 30: Structural and Residual Effects (2007-2012)**

Note: For European immigrants, structural effects should lead to a difference in the average unemployment rate of 1.6 point, but this is offset by negative residual effects (-2.2%). Finally, the difference in average unemployment rate for these immigrants is only -0.6%.


However, once difficulties of access to employment and the types of positions held are taken into account, there is no significant difference in the level of remuneration or working time. This is also true for women: female descendants of immigrants often work part-time and are in situations of under-employment just as often as are women not directly descended from immigrants.

**More Downgrading into Low-Skilled Jobs for Young Men Descended from North African Immigrants**

Another indicator of the quality of integration is whether the level of diploma corresponds to the category of position held. Young men with secondary school diplomas who are descendants of immigrants experience more downgrading than other young people and they less frequently obtain a first job as a manual worker or a skilled employee. Even after controlling for structural effects (particularly from the diploma), young men descended from immigrants from the Maghreb are more likely to be in low-skilled jobs; they also have a very strong subjective feeling that they have been downgraded, i.e., that their skills are underutilised.

**Young Men Descended from Southern European Immigrants Are More Frequently in the Construction Trades**

Although occupational segregation is less prevalent for descendants of immigrants than for immigrants, young descendants of immigrants do not work in the same sectors as their peers not directly descended from immigrants. While young descendants of North African immigrants more frequently work in the social and transport sectors (not to mention hotels and restaurants for young women), young male descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe are frequently found in the construction or electricity-electronics sectors, according to their father’s specialisation and benefiting from their social networks. This career orientation helps them find a job.

**Under-Representation in the Civil Service**

In 2010, only 10% of the jobs held by descendants of immigrants were in the civil service, against 14% for natives. All three branches of civil service (state, local and hospitals) reflect this deficiency. Controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, descendants of immigrants have 8% lower likelihood to work in the civil service than natives. While true on average, this effect differs strongly by the origin of immigrant parents and the type of civil service. Thus, being a descendant of African immigrants, except those from the Maghreb, reduces by more than a quarter (29%) the likelihood of being a salaried employee of the state civil service rather than the private sector, but increases by more than 50% the likelihood of being a salaried employee of the public hospital service.
Less Use of Networking for Professional Integration

This difference is primarily a question of network effects. Descendants of African immigrants have less recourse to professional, personal or family networks; however, these networks constitute, together with unsolicited applications, the main recruitment channels in France. This is, in particular, a result of their original social background. More often finding work as manual workers or lower grade white-collar workers, African immigrant parents are also much more likely than others to be withdrawn from the labour market: fathers are more frequently unemployed or retired and mothers are most likely to have never worked.41 Therefore, their children have less recourse to professional networks and are more likely to seek a job locally.42 Descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe benefit more from their parents’ professional networks. This helps them find jobs more rapidly, most often related to their father’s sector.

Discriminatory Phenomena Based on Supposed Origin or Place of Residence

Ethnic discrimination constitutes an aggravating factor. As already discussed, the observed differences in unemployment or employment between the descendants of immigrants and natives, the descendants of immigrants and immigrants, and among descendants of immigrants themselves, are based on multiple aspects: individual characteristics (level of initial training and sector concerned, age, gender, parents’ socio-professional category) as well as local characteristics (place of residence). For these observable characteristics, the differences reflect the mechanisms at work in the labour market for all individuals. However, after controlling for these effects, a significant portion of these differences remains unexplained for some young descendants of immigrants, without the ability to precisely distinguish the result of variables that are not integrated in the surveys (e.g. network effects or mastering language skills) or a form of ethnic penalty.43 Some of these differences can be attributed to discriminatory behaviour concerning these populations.

To complement the econometric analyses presented, “testing” techniques allow us to understand discriminatory behaviour of employers by isolating the effect of a criterion on the probability of being summoned for a job interview or hired. Since the mid-2000s, this experimental method has revealed negative discrimination against descendants of African immigrants, especially men.44 Testing programmes that seek to isolate the effect of one’s place of residence on the probability of being summoned for a job interview also tend to prove the existence of territorial discrimination.45 This feeling of being discriminated against is particularly strong among individuals directly descended from immigrants: a quarter of immigrants and descendants of immigrants reported having experienced discrimination in the past five years, the proportion reaching nearly 50% for immigrants and descendants of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa.46 For the latter, they perceive skin colour to be the main criterion for the discrimination. Living in a ZUS also increases the feeling of having experienced discrimination related to employment47 but, all things being equal, the origin of immigrants remains the key variable for self-reporting of discrimination.

Finally, this situation, which makes it more difficult for descendants of immigrants to find jobs and focuses on those whose parents immigrated from Africa, is partially based on phenomena external to the labour market. Complementing the educational barriers already discussed, the burden of the environment, both in terms of spatial location and of living conditions and standards, is also crucial.

SPATIAL CONCENTRATION AND HOUSING CONDITIONS

Immigrants and their descendants are not evenly distributed across France.48 While those of European origin largely escape the phenomena of segregation and concentration, African immigrants and their descendants do not: they are highly concentrated in certain regions and, within these, in certain cities, are often poor and live with a high proportion of immigrants. Less likely to own their home, three times

45. For a summary of testing techniques and their limitations, see “Effets de quartier, discrimination territoriale et accès à l’emploi “, Document de l’ONZUS, No. 4, juin 2013. The place of residence was added as a new criterion of discrimination prohibited by the French Labour Code in the law of 21 February 2014 concerning city planning and urban cohesion.
more likely to live in public housing when they rent, they also encounter discrimination phenomena in access to housing, as established by several surveys using testing techniques.

*Immigrants and their Descendants Are Concentrated in Poor Cities and Neighbourhoods... with a High Proportion of Immigrants*

Immigrants are concentrated in the poorest cities, but also those with the highest density of social housing, unemployed people and immigrants (Figure 6). This essentially concerns immigrants from Africa (including North-Africa), since immigrants of European origin do not stand out as clearly from those not directly descended from immigrants. This phenomenon of African immigrants being concentrated is slightly less marked for their descendants.

In 2008, for the 18-50 age group, 19% of immigrants and 14% of their direct descendants live in a ZUS, against only 4% of other residents of metropolitan France in private households. A segregation index has been calculated for the immigrant population in Île-de-France. Within a neighbourhood or municipality, this index measures the proportion of residents who would need to leave in order to yield a composition identical to the rest of the reference territory. In 1999, in “urban unit” neighbourhoods with more than 50,000 inhabitants, North Africans, sub-Saharan Africans and immigrants from Southeast Asia proved to be the most segregated groups. Nevertheless, between 1968 and 1999, segregation declined 5% for North African immigrants, 9% for African immigrants, 1.7% for Asians and 3.6% for Europeans.

Over a similar time interval (1968-2005), the share of people under 18 with immigrant backgrounds increased significantly, from 11.5% to 18.1%. Moreover, while more than three-quarters of young people with immigrant backgrounds were of European origin in 1968, only a quarter of them were in 2005. Obviously, the share of young people with immigrant backgrounds varies greatly from one region or municipality to another. Île-de-France has the highest concentration: it rose from 16% in 1968 to 37% in 2005. In Seine-Saint-Denis (an area north-east of Paris), in the same period, it increased from 19% to 57%. In 2005, it reached 41% in Paris, 40% in Val-de-Marne (an area south-east of Paris) and 38% in Val-d’Oise (an area north of Paris). [Editor’s note: These three areas are all within Île-de-France.] In some municipalities within Île-de-France, this concentration of young people with immigrant backgrounds can reach very high levels: 70% of youth in Saint-Denis and Grigny; about 75% in Clichy-sous-Bois, Aubervilliers and La Courneuve.

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**Figure 6. Concentration of 18-50 Year Olds by Immigrant Origins (2008)**


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49. Fiscal potential: median fiscal revenue per consumption unit, measured in a municipality, where fiscal revenue corresponds to the total amount of resources reported by taxpayers on their income tax returns.

50. People who share the same principal residence, whether or not they are related.


Less Often Owners, More Often in Public Housing

In 2008, for those 18-50 years of age living in private households, the proportion of owner-occupied households was 33% overall for immigrants, but with wide disparities: 15% for immigrants from Africa (excluding North Africa), but 50% for immigrants from Europe and 54% for immigrants from Southeast Asia. For descendants of immigrants, the share of owner-occupied households rose to 41% (24% for descendants of African immigrants excluding North Africa, but 51% for the descendants of immigrants from the EU-27). For other residents, the proportion is 55%.

The ownership rate gap for immigrants can be partly explained by differences related to age, (lower) income and concentration in large cities where real estate is more expensive. After controlling for these structural effects, descendants of immigrants were more likely to live in an owner-occupied household than other residents not directly descended from immigrants. However, this was not the case for the descendants of North African immigrants and a fortiori for descendants of immigrants from the rest of Africa.

In 2008, the share of 18 to 50-year-olds who live in public housing was 33% for immigrants. Again, disparities were significant: 46% for immigrants from Africa and the Maghreb, against 13% for those from the EU-27. Taking descendants of immigrants as a whole, the proportion drops to 28% (46% for descendants of African immigrants, 43% for the Maghreb, 16% for the EU-27). Only 14% of those not directly descended from immigrants lived in social housing.

Twice as Likely to Occupy Poor-Quality Housing

According to the criteria of the SRU (urban renewal law), 6% of immigrant households live in poor-quality housing, against 3% for other households. This is the case for 10% of households of immigrants from Africa (excluding North Africa). Note that when immigrant households rent from the private sector, they are twice as often to live in poor-quality housing than in public housing. Moreover, while overcrowding concerns only 5% of non-immigrant households (at least two people), it affects 19% of households with descendants of immigrants and 25% of immigrant households.54

Rather High Residential Mobility within Public Housing

For a given age bracket, urban unit and revenue per consumption unit, immigrants and descendants of immigrants from Africa changed residences in the last five years more frequently than the rest of the population. Changes in occupancy status are less common, especially concerning those who leave social housing. 63% of immigrants who were tenants of low-rent housing before moving remain in public housing, against 54% of descendants of an immigrant parent and only 36% of those who are not immigrants or descendants of an immigrant parent.

Discrimination in Access to Housing

In the INED Trajectories and Origins survey (Trajectoires et Origines, TeO), African and North African immigrants state three to four times more often than the majority population that over the last five years they were denied housing without a valid reason. This discriminatory experience seems less frequent for descendants of immigrants from Africa and the Maghreb, although it remains substantially higher than for the majority population.

These phenomena of discrimination in access to housing were confirmed by several surveys using testing techniques. For example:

- a testing programme concerning real estate agencies was carried out at the request of the HALDE (anti-discrimination authority) in 2006 in three regions. 126 rental listings from 120 agencies were tested by 15 applicants, differentiated by their origin or their family situation. With equivalent standards of living, reference applicants (men 28 years of age with a name typically associated with a native of Metropolitan France) got an appointment twice as easily to visit an apartment and, at the end of the visit, they were four times more likely to get the apartment than applicants of North African or African origin;55

- a testing programme was conducted by ISM Corum in Villeurbanne from late November 2010 to mid-April 2011 at the request of the municipality, comparing fictitious applicants “of French origin” with applicants “of North African origin.” In 57% of tests, the applicant “of French origin” was favoured over the applicant “of North African origin,” against 39% of cases where the two received equal treatment;56

53. With, of course, an impact due to how long ago they immigrated; this is different for the former and the latter.
54. Housing is considered overcrowded if it has fewer rooms than the following standard: a living room for the household; one room for each couple; a room for single people 19 and over; and, for single people under 19 years, one room for two children if they are of the same gender or are under seven years old; otherwise one room per child.
a testing programme was conducted in early 2014 by the consumer advocacy magazine “60 millions de consommateurs” regarding real estate agencies. It demonstrated significantly higher refusal rates (one third) for the “African” rental applicant (Babacar, 31 years old, salesman) compared to the “reference” applicant (Anne, 28, executive assistant, single), for whom the refusal rate was zero.57

### INCOME, HEALTH AND PARTICIPATION IN SOCIETY

While a person’s economic integration is partially based on his education and the labour market, it also depends on his social integration. His health status, standard of living and, more broadly, living conditions, have an impact on academic success and finding work. However, immigrants and their descendants experience inequality in multiple areas of social integration, although it is less profound than for economic integration. These are partly based on individual characteristics, and in some cases, the parents’ situation. For example, in a society that is decreasingly mobile economically, children of low-income parents are more likely to live in a low-income household when they become adults. Immigrants have a lower standard of living than the non-immigrant population, and while the gap is narrowing between the descendants of immigrants and natives, it remains significant. The situation is basically comparable for health and more mixed for participation in community work and political life.

### A Lower Standard of Living, Leading to a More Pronounced Incidence of Poverty

The median standard of living for immigrants is lower than that of non-immigrants, and the gap is widening (Figure 7). It was 50% in 2007 (€12,440 against €18,690) and 52% in 2011 (€13,360 against €20,310).58 However, there are wide disparities by geographic origin. African immigrants have the lowest median standard of living (€12,240 in 2011), while European immigrants have the highest (€16,520). These differences in standard of living between immigrants and nonimmigrants can be explained by a lower average salary from less-skilled jobs, lower investment income due to less wealth and lower pensions and retirement income.

Immigrants are more affected by poverty, a situation that has escalated in recent years: their poverty rate increased from 36.1% to 38.6% between 2007 and 2011, while it remained stable at 11.3% for the non-immigrant population. In 2011, it was almost twice as high for immigrants from Africa (44.1%) as for those of European origin (24.8%).

The standard of living for descendants of immigrants is comparable to that of their parents until they leave home, and then it improves: in 2008, 31% were below the poverty line when they lived with their parents, against 12.5% after leaving home. The figure is 10.6% for natives.59 The persistence of this gap is partly explained by the socio-demographic characteristics of descendants of immigrants. For example, they are younger than the rest of the population. After controlling for these characteristics, descendants of African origin aged 25-34 have a probability of being in monetary poverty 4.7 points higher than the rest of the population (9.2 points for those under 25).

### Figure 7. Median Income and Poverty Rates by Geographic Origin of the Household’s Reference Person

![Figure 7. Median Income and Poverty Rates by Geographic Origin of the Household’s Reference Person](chart)

**Source:** fiche 1.20 “Niveau de vie des immigrés”, in Insee Références – 2010 and 2014 editions: Les revenus et le patrimoine des ménages.

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Poorer Health and Inferior Health Coverage

In addition to disparities in standard of living, immigrants experience inequalities concerning health. They are more likely than non-immigrants to report poor health: in 2008, amounting to 18% of men (against 15% for non-immigrants) and 25% of women (16% for non-immigrants). This has not always been the case. In the 1980s and 1990s, immigrants' health appeared better than that of non-immigrants, but the situation was reversed in the 2000s. This change is partly due to the use of different data and indicators. However, it seems that another reason is the increasingly rapid deterioration of immigrants' health. This is due to reduced benefits from certain aspects of their lifestyle (alcohol consumption, diet rich in vegetables and fruits, etc.) as well as a "wearing down" related to tougher socio-economic conditions and the loss of social ties as a result of immigration.

Descendants of immigrants also more frequently report poor health than natives do (12% against 10% for men; 15% against 12% for women). Poor health is most frequently reported by descendants of Spanish, Italian and Algerian immigrants. After controlling for socio-demographic variables, we see that the geographic origin of the parents no longer has a significant effect on the state of health, except for girls whose parents are from Spain and Italy. (This result remains unexplained.)

Descendants of immigrants have a rate of coverage by social security coupled with complementary health insurance lower than the rest of the population (81% against 93% for men, 83% against 93% for women). They also are more likely not to seek treatment for a health problem or to refuse care. Finally, descendants of immigrants (especially from sub-Saharan Africa, Algeria, Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia) are more likely than other patients to experience poor reception or treatment by health personnel.

Strong Family Relationships and a Keen Interest in Politics Despite Lower Turnout for Elections

Descendants of immigrants leave their parents' home later than natives do. This is particularly true for those from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey and for men. This observation is explained by greater job instability and fewer unmarried people. When they leave home, descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey live in closer proximity to their parents than natives do. In addition, they maintain closer relationships with their family, much like descendants of Southern European immigrants. Descendants of immigrants socialise with their neighbours less than natives do, while there appears to be no significant difference concerning their socialising with friends.

Regarding civic life, descendants of immigrants join associations more frequently than their parents (29% against 24%), but less frequently than non-immigrants (36%). Those from sub-Saharan Africa, Spain, Italy and the rest of the EU-27 have the highest membership rates. The rate is lowest for those of Algerian origin (22%) and Turkish origin (26%). After controlling for a series of socio-economic variables, we find that the descendants of immigrants from North Africa, Southeast Asia, Turkey and Portugal are less likely to join an association.

Descendants of immigrants have a stronger interest in politics than natives do; this result persists even after controlling for socio-demographic variables. However, they are slightly less often registered to vote (84% against 89% for men; 88% against 89% for women) and have slightly lower participation in elections. After controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, geographic origin no longer seems to have a significant impact in this regard.

CONCLUSION

Young descendants of immigrants remain particularly affected by barriers to professional integration. This has worsened since the 2008 crisis, despite successive measures that have been taken concerning both education and employment.

This situation particularly affects young descendants of African immigrants (including those from the Maghreb) as compared to their peers not directly descended from immigrants: twice as many under 30 are unemployed and the participation rate of young women is significantly lower. Less skilled, these young people are more exposed to job insecurity, suffer from unstable career paths and less frequently work in the state civil service. These difficulties engender a lower standard of living and more frequent situations of poverty.

Several types of factors, partly interdependent, have been proposed to explain the particular difficulties faced by young descendants of immigrants: a more modest socio-economic background than the rest of the population; more difficult academic paths and more students leaving the education system without a diploma or with lower degree levels, especially for boys; less favourable courses of study and low retention levels in higher education, and, for those in professional programmes, less access to apprenticeships; spatial concentration in neighbourhoods and municipalities subject to multiple economic and social difficulties.

Nevertheless, these factors alone cannot explain the differences that have been cited in terms of economic integration. Even after controlling for structural effects (parents’ social origin, level of diploma, location), a higher risk of unemployment persists for descendants of immigrants. This unexplained gap is a product of factors that are not considered in surveys, including discrimination phenomena.

In view of these observations, should specific attention to the origins of these young people – born and socialised in France – be the starting point for differentiation among French citizens according to their immigration background? Ordinary-law policies should certainly be leveraged, namely employment, education and housing policies, and strengthened policies to fight discrimination. However, given the specific difficulties that have been identified, we must urgently consider means to supplement these policies with specific measures to benefit disadvantaged neighbourhoods, as well as descendants of immigrants. These actions must be accompanied by measures to ensure increased political representation for these populations.\(^\text{67}\)

67. See, in particular the thematic report *Restaurer la confiance dans le modèle républicain*, carried out in the framework of “Quelle France dans dix ans ?” project, France Stratégie, 2014, www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/thematique-restaurer-confiance modele-republicain

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